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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Although the statute of limitations may have barred the assess-
ment and collection of any additional sum, it does not obliterate
the right of the United States to retain payments already received
when they do not exceed the amount which might have been
properly assessed and demanded.
The Wisconsin court did not address itself to the policy argu-
ment that the statute of limitations was enacted to provide a defi-
nite time after which a taxpayer need not be prepared to prove that
his tax returns were proper. The court in its decision has even
adopted the broadest possible definition of "transaction" which
opens the entire year when a refund claim is filed rather than
resticting the Department of Revenue to the narrow area covered
by the refund claim.
This decision brings the Wisconsin and federal views in line
with each other. This seems to be a desirable result from the stand-
point of tax advisors as well as taxpayers. In addition, where setoff
and recoupment 33 are both given similar treatment, it does not
matter whether the government or the taxpayer is the first to sue.
SANDRA L. DEGRAW
TORTS
I. NEGLIGENT LIABILITY
A. Architects' Negligence
In A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc.' and Rosenthal
v. Kurtz2 the supreme court this term furnished a restatement of
the law of architects' tort liability.
A.E. Investment Corp. involved a claim by a sublessee seeking
damages for loss of past and future profits, loss of fixtures and
merchandise, and loss of goodwill, all resulting from defendant
architects' alleged negligence in designing and supervising con-
struction of a commercial building. Defendants argued that plain-
33. In the event the government has made an assessment for a year which is now barred
by the statute of limitations, the taxpayer can raise his claim for refund under the recoup-
ment theory. Thus the theory is the "mirror-image" of setoff. See, Rothensies v. Electric
Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946).
1. 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974).
2. 62 Wis. 2d 1, 213 N.W.2d 741 (1974).
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tiffs damages could not be recoverable because absent privity of
contract, defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff.' The supreme
court disagreed, holding that the issue of duty was relevant only
to the determination of negligence.' Once negligence is established,
liability goes hand in hand with the cause in fact, subject only to
equitable limitation on policy grounds. The court further pointed
out that absence of privity is not a defense in tort actions.5
On the issue of economic damages, the court stated that Wis-
consin, a minority jurisdiction, allows recovery in tort for such
loss,6 subject to considerations of public policy. 7 These policy con-
siderations include remoteness from the negligent conduct, dispro-
portion of the conduct to its effect, and the unreasonableness of the
burden of prevention which would be placed upon the defendant.'
The court went on to instruct on the special problems raised in
negligence cases involving architects. Although A.E. Investment's
complaint alleged exclusively latent defects, the court stated that
future cases involving both latent and patent defects should be
handled in the framework of comparative negligence since a plain-
tiff might be contributorily negligent in accepting the risk pre-
sented by patent defects. 0
B. Wrongful Birth
In Slawek v. Stroh" the supreme court was confronted for the
first time with a claim for "wrongful birth." The action, raised by
counterclaim, was prosecuted upon the theory that the plaintiff in
seducing counterclaimant's mother, could reasonably foresee that
his act would result in the birth of a child. Since plaintiff was
married, he could also foresee that the child would suffer anguish
by being born an "adulterine bastard." The court failed to discover
precedent for the cause of action, but cited an Illinois case 2 which
recognized the possibility of a tort for wrongful birth. The Illinois
court nevertheless had affirmed a demurrer on policy considera-
3. 62 Wis. 2d at 483, 214 N.W.2d at 766.
4. Id.
5. 62 Wis. 2d at 486, 487, 214 N.W.2d at 768.
6. See Krueger v. Steffen, 30 Wis. 2d 445, 450, 141 N.W.2d 200, 202 (1966).
7. 62 Wis. 2d at 490, 214 N.W.2d at 770.
8. Id. at 491, 214 N.W.2d at 770.
9. Colla v. Mandella, I Wis. 2d 594, 598-599, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
10. 62 Wis. 2d at 490, 214 N.W.2d at 769.
11. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 316, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
12. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
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tions. Both the Illinois and Wisconsin courts feared that recogni-
tion of such an action would unduly burden the courts. 13
The court dealt with a similar issue in Rieck v. Medical Protec-
tive Co..'4 Rieck involved a negligence claim against an obstetri-
cian for misdiagnosis of plaintiff wife's pregnancy, the plaintiff
parents contending that they would have aborted the pregnancy
had they known of it. They sought as damages the cost of raising
the child. The supreme court reversed, again on public policy
grounds, the trial court's overruling of defendant's demurrer. To
do otherwise, the court stated, would be to create "a new category
of surrogate parent" who would be required to bear all of the
financial burden of raising the child, but who could enjoy none of
the rewards of parenthood. 5 This result was found to be inequita-
ble.' " A "wrongful birth" action for negligent sterilization would
meet with the same prohibition based on public policy. 7 The birth
of a healthy child will not be viewed as injury in the eyes of the
law.
C. Governmental Immunity
Governmental tort liability in Wisconsin, which expanded when
Holytz v. Milwaukee8 abrogated substantive governmental im-
munity in 1962, was reviewed in this term's two Cords9 cases with
respect to procedural immunity.
Cords v. Ehly was a personal injury action stemming from a
fall in a state park. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, managers
and administrators of the park, were negligent in failing to provide
either warning or safeguards along a park footpath. Since the state
cannot, by terms of article IV, sec. 27 of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion, 20 be sued in tort absent its consent, defendants were amenable
13. 62 Wis. 2d at 317, 318, 215 N.W.2d at 22.
14. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
15. Id. at 518, 219 N.W.2d at 244, 245.
16. Id. at 519, 219 N.W.2d at 245.
17. Id., citing Shaheen v. Knight, II Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (Lycoming County 1957).
18. Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), which abrogated
substantive governmental immunity as to "all public bodies" in Wisconsin. Id. at 40, 115
N.W.2d at 625. The decision did not affect the "procedural" immunity afforded the state
by article IV, section 27, Wisconsin Constitution. See note 20, infra.
19. Cords v. Ehly, 62 Wis. 2d 31, 214 N.W.2d 432 (1974); Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d
42, 214 N.W.2d 405 (1974).
20. Wis. Const. art. IV, § 27 reads as follows: "The legislature shall direct by law in
what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state."
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to suit only if their management of the park was distinguishable
from an act of the state. Stated in another way, defendants were
within the state's sovereign procedural immunity if they were per-
forming discretionary, delegable acts as opposed to ministerial,
non-delegable acts.2' Plaintiffs claimed that even if defendants'
actions were discretionary, Wisconsin Statute section 270.58 cre-
ates a statutory cause of action against the state. Under this
statute, the state idemnifies its employees against tort judgments
arising out of their employment.? The court disagreed, holding
that the statute merely pays off judgments obtained at common
law. The court went on to hold that plaintiffs had alleged facts
sufficient to permit them to prove that the management of the park
was the responsibility of the defendants personally, rather than
that of the state? Therefore, the defendants' act of omission might
21. [Discretionary acts are] decisions [which] involve the exercise of judgment
or discretion rather than the mere performance of a prescribed task. Meyer v.
Carmen, 271 Wis. 329, 332, 73 N.W.2d 514, 515 (1955). Official action . . . is
ministerial when it is absolute, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a
set task, and when the law which imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode
and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judg-
ment or discretion. Id. at 332, 73 N.W.2d at 516.
E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 225 § 53.33 (3d ed. 1949).
22. WIs. STAT. § 270.58(1) reads in pertinent part:
Where the defendant in any action of special proceeding is a public officer or em-
ploye and is proceeded against in his official capacity or is proceeded against as an
individual because of acts committed while carrying out his duties as an officer or
employee and the jury or the court finds that he acted in good faith the judgment as
to damages and costs entered against the officer or employe shall be paid by the state
or political subdivision of which he is an officer or employe.
23. 62 Wis. 2d at 35, 214 N.W.2d at 434.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 40, 214 N.W.2d at 437. The application of the discretionary/ministerial
distinction where the same persons may be either is seen in the following excerpt from this
term's Naker v. Town of Trenton, 62 Wis. 2d 654, 660a, 213 N.W.2d 38, 217 N.W.2d 665,
666:
Under Firkus v. Rombalski, 25 Wis. 2d 352, 358, 130 N.W.2d 835, we held that
whether a town chose to erect a traffic sign was a legislative matter - and there was
governmental immunity in respect to the locating of the sign [within department
guidelines. Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 102, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973)].
Once the decision is made and the sign is erected, the legislative function is termi-
nated and the doctrine of Holytz that imposes liability for want of ordinary care
takes over.
Thus in Meyer v. Carmen, supra note 21, a school board was held not subject to suit for
failure to place a fence on a dangerous school ground precipice, the decision being discre-
tionary. Meyer is rather weakly distinguished on its facts in Cords v. Ehly as the court bases
its holding on Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973), wherein district
highway directors claimed that the duty to use due care in placement of a road sign had
been delegated to those state employees, members of the sign crew, who actually dug the
19751
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be found ministerial. 26
The second Cords case,27 arising out of the same facts, was an
all-out assault by plaintiffs on the procedural state immunity af-
forded by article IV, sec. 27. Due process and equal protection
arguments, also raised in earlier cases28 were quickly, although
reluctantly, disposed of by the court..29 The requirements of due
process were found to be satisfied by chapter 16 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, which provides for quasi-judicial redress through an ad-
ministrative claims board, and by the availability of private legisla-
tive bills.3 0 Likewise, consent to suit was not arbitrarily denied
plaintiffs by the legislative decision to permit suits against the state
only for negligence in the operation of state-owned and operated
motor vehicles and airplanes .3 The court found the classification
to be a reasonable one, based upon the consideration that such
operation involves exclusively ministerial acts.3
2
The new argument advanced in Cords v. State against proce-
dural immunity sounds in contract. It is that section 270.58 makes
the state the liability insurer of state employees and thereby sub-
jects the state to Wisconsin's direct action statute. The court found,
however, that section 270.58 raises a purely statutory, as opposed
to contractual, obligation for the state to pay its agents' tort judg-
ments. The performance of this obligation may be compelled, if at
all, only by an action in mandamus. 33 Section 260.11(l) provides
for joinder on the basis of insurers' contractual obligation to pay
defendants' damages. Thus, although the function of the statute
and the alleged contract is the same, the court refused to adopt
hole and implanted the sign pole. The rule being propounded with respect to the evolution
of ministerial liability from discretionary acts is similar to the rule governing the negligent
performance of a gratuitous act (see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 [1965]). That
is, in the words of Justice Robert Hansen, there is a duty "to keep up what one did not
have to put up." Naker v. Town of Trenton, 62 Wis. 2d at 658, 215 N.W.2d 40 (concerning
road signs).
26. 62 Wis. 2d at 41, 214 N.W.2d at 437. For limitations on such state employee
liability, see new Wis. STAT. § 895.45, created by Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 333, § 182c.
27. 62 Wis. 2d at 42, 214 N.W.2d at 405.
28. See Forseth v. Sweet, 38 Wis. 2d 676, 158 N.W.2d 370 (1968); Chart v. Gutmann,
44 Wis. 2d 421, 171 N.W.2d 331 (1969).
29. Asked by appellants to abolish the state's procedural immunity the court responded
that although "fairness required a change" and the legislature had had ample time to act,
the court was powerless to abrogate a section of the constitution. 62 Wis. 2d at 50, 214
N.W.2d at 410.
30. 62 Wis. 2d at 52, 53, 214 N.W.2d at 411.
31. WIs. STAT. 114.065 and 345.05 (1971).
32. 62 Wis. 2d at 52, 53, 214 N.W.2d at 411.
33. Id. at 56, 214 N.W.2d at 413.
[Vol. 58
TERM OF THE COURT
appellants' argument on the ground that the drafters of the direct
action statute probably did not envision as "insurance" non-
contractual obligations to idemnify.31
The Wisconsin Supreme Court clearly favors the abolition of
procedural immunity.35 However, such abolition, absent the abro-
gation of the discretionary-ministerial dichotomy, would not nec-
essarily increase state exposure to tort liability. 6 This is because
a governmental body can be liable in tort only by means of the rule
of respondeat superior, requiring an agency relationship. The doc-
trine of discretionary non-liability limits this relationship between
the state and its officials.37 Born of the necessity for flexibility in
the making of judicial, legislative, and administrative decisions, 38
this doctrine appears to be based upon the theory that government
officials by definition exercise due care in their good-faith deliber-
ate acts. 9
Had the Cords plaintiffs succeeded in breaching or abolishing
article IV, section 27, what would have been the result? The discre-
tionary-ministerial issue, a question of fact,4" still remained. If the
state park administrators could be shown to have functioned minis-
terially in their failure to provide warnings or safeguards for the
injured plaintiffs, they would by that fact be shown to have acted
as private individuals, and thereby be outside the scope of the
hypothetically avoided section 27 prerogative. If, on the other
hand, they were determined to have acted as discretionary state
agents, they would be identified with the state and accorded im-
munity despite the ineffectuality of procedural immunity.
II. STRICT AND STATUTORY LIABILITY
A. Products Liability
Products liability was treated in several cases this term. Jagmin
v. Simonds Abrasive Co.4" held that "a res ipsa [loquitur] type of
34. Id. at 56, 57, 214 N.W.2d at 413.
35. Id. at 50, 214 N.W.2d at 410.
36. Id.
37. "This decision [to abrogate the doctrine of governmental immunity] is not to be
interpreted as imposing liability on a governmental body in the exercise of its legislative or
judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions." 17 Wis. 2d at 40, 115 N.W.2d at
625. See also Appel v. Halvorsen, 50 Wis. 2d 230, 235, 184 N.W.2d 99, 102 (1971).
38. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 987 (4th ed. 1971).
39. "[H]enceforward, so far as governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the
rule is liability - the exception is immunity." 17 Wis. 2d at 40, 115 N.W.2d at 625.
40. 62 Wis. 2d at 41, 214 N.W.2d at 437.
41. 61 Wis. 2d 60, 211 N.W.2d 810 (1973).
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inference is enough to establish a product defect if the plaintiff can
show that he was properly using the product and can negative other
possible causes of the product failure after it left the manufac-
turer's control. ' 42
A comparison is made in Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods,
Inc.41 between the application of res ipsa loquitur to bursting
bottle cases and the inferences allowed in products liability cases.
In bursting bottle cases negligence is inferred by means of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine. In products cases in Wisconsin, a defendant-
caused defect may be inferred and with it negligence per se is
established." The elements of the orthodox res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine in Wisconsin are that the accident is, first, best explained by
negligence and, second, caused by an instrumentality controlled by
the defendant at the time of the alleged negligent act.45 In bursting
bottle cases the second element is satisfied by showing that the
condition of the bottle probably did not change after it left the
defendant's control.46 A similar element is proved in products lia-
bility cases by introducing evidence rebutting the probable exist-
ence of other causes, as in Jagmin.47 Technically proof of the ab-
sence of other causes creates the inference that a defect arose in
the product while in the hands of the defendant. This proof satisfies
the requirement under strict products liability that no substantial
change occurred in the product after it left the hands of the defen-
dant.48 There is, however, a difference in legal function, of the res
ipsa element and the products liability requirement since the for-
mer goes to prove the actual negligence cause of action while the
latter goes to the question of superseding cause.
The Jagmin case reveals how far one might go in a products
liability case with the res ipsa type inference of a defendant-caused
defect. Jagmin involved the unexplained disintegration of a grind-
ing wheel which had seventy-five per cent of its useful life left.
There was no evidence to suggest either a machine malfunction or
improper use by the plaintiff. Stating that the case was "exceed-
42. Id. at 73, 211 N.W.2d at 817.
43. 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974).
44. Id. at 540, 219 N.W.2d 397. With respect to negligence per sesee Dippel v. Sciano,
37 Wis. 2d 443, 461, 155 N.W.2d 55, 66 (1967).
45. Zarling v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 2 Wis. 2d 596, 600, 87 N.W.2d 263,
266 (1958).
46. Id. at 601, 87 N.W.2d at 266.
47. See also Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A(l)(b).
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ingly close,"49 the supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling
for the plaintiff citing an Illinois case" in which a chip broke off a
hammer and caused an injury. The hammer had been in use for
eleven months. Our court applied the case as follows:
[A] new hammer is unlikely to chip but . . . after some
period of use work hardening might make chipping a reasonable
expectation and part of the hammer's likely performance. The
[Jagmin trial] court realized that problems arise in the middle
range. How long should a manufacturer be liable for his product?
The Illinois court decided the answer was for the jury."
What is at issue is not a policy-limitation of cause, which would
be for the court. What is at issue is a factual inference of a product
defect in the hands of the defendant.
To defeat the inference the defendant must show that the defect
was probably caused after his relinquishment of control by product
use, misuse or mishandling. Wisconsin cases show that this defense
is not an easy one to prove. Normal rigors of handling must be
anticipated,5 2 as must, per Jagmin, a substantial amount of normal
wear. Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co.,53 another term case, holds
that the defendant must also anticipate misuse where it is reasona-
bly forseeable.54 Thus defendant may not reduce his exposure to
products liability by means of arbitrarily narrow intended-use in-
structions.55 But neither dare he make the warning over-broad be-
cause warned-against misuse is conclusively forseeable misuse.
B. Public Nuisance
There were two public nuisance cases this term. State v. H.
Samuels Co.57 involved an action to enjoin the operation of a junk-
yard in violation of a City of Portage ordinance regulating noise
and vibrations. Defendant junkyard had operated at the same loca-
tion from the beginning of the century and had been processing
49. 61 Wis. 2d at 77, 211 N.W.2d at 815.
50. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 41 I11. 2d 339, 247 N.E. 2d 401 (1969).
51. 61 Wis. 2d at 70, 211 N.W.2d at 815.
52. Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 514, 93 N.W.2d 467, 475
(1958).
53. 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d -279 (1974).
54. Id. at 738, 741-742, 218 N.W.2d at 287. Schuh also held that effective warning of
foreseeable misuse is a condition precedent to contributory negligence by such misuse. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 743, 218 N.W.2d at 298.
57. 60 Wis. 2d 631, 211 N.W.2d 417 (1973).
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derelict automobiles since 1948. When the city refused to enforce
its ordinances against defendant, nearby residents sought relief
from the state, which was empowered by section 280.02, Wisconsin
Statutes, to enjoin public nuisances. The trial court refused to
enjoin, however, stating that the ordinances had not been demon-
strated to be inadequate as a means of curtailing the problem.
The supreme court reversed, preferring the "modern concept of
injunctional relief" which states that the superior remedy is the
appropriate remedy.58 To arrive at this result the court reasoned
as follows. Equity cannot enforce the criminal law by enjoining the
commission of a crime. If a criminal statute applies, resort must
be had to it to administer criminal justice. Equity can, however,
enjoin a nuisance, as such, which may also fall within a criminal
statute. 9 Finally, open and intentional violations of a criminal
statute constitute a public nuisance per se regardless of whether the
condutt in question would otherwise create a public nuisance. 0
Moreover repeated public violations of any statute constitute a
public nuisance." Thus usury12 or employment of unlicensed opti-
cians can be a public nuisance.63 As there is no difference between
a statute and an ordinance in this respect, repeated violations of
an ordinance are a nuisance per se and subject to the modern
concept of injunctional relief.64
A public nuisance is an injury in any substantial degree to
public property, civil rights or health.65 This term's State v. Mi-
chaels Pipeline Construction, Inc.,6" stands for the proposition that
such injury need not affect the whole community but may reach
persons generally in a local neighborhood or such part of the public
as come in contact with the nuisance. 7 Michaels Pipeline involved
a lowering of the watertable along the route of a sewer construction
58. Id. at 637, 211 N.W.2d at 420. See State ex rel. Fairchild v. Wisconsin Automotive
Trades Ass'n, 254 Wis. 398, 403, 37 N.W.2d 98 (1949).
59. 60 Wis. 2d at 636, 211 N.W.2d at 419.
60. Id.
61. "Every place where a public statute is openly, publicly, repeatedly, continuously,
persistently and intentionally violated, is a public nuisance." State ex rel. Abott v. House
of Vision, 259 Wis. 87, 91, 47 N.W.2d 321, 323 (1951).
62. State v. J. C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
63. 259 Wis. 87, 47 N.W.2d 321 (1951).
64. 60 Wis. 2d at 639, 211 N.W.2d at 421.
65. 60 Wis. 2d at 638, 211 N.W.2d at 420.
66. 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974).
67. The latter alternative obtained in Boden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N.W.2d
156 (1957).
[Vol. 58
TERM OF THE COURT
project. This dewatering caused dry or diminished wells and land
subsidence on residential properties contiguous to the sewer line.
Efforts, no matter how zealously pursued, to prevent or reduce
damage were regarded by the court as irrelevant to the question
of whether a nuisance existed68 as were considerations of social
benefits flowing from defendant's business operations or length of
time the business has endured. 9
The test of whether a public nuisance should be enjoined is a
balancing test. The amount of damages caused to the public by the
nuisance is weighed against the harm an injunction would cause the
defendant."° The balance is not between the damage caused to the
public and the social or economic benefit derived from the
complained-of activity.7'
C. Workmen's Compensation
May a corporate officer be sued in negligence by an employee
for a work-related injury in Wisconsin? The 1936 case of
Hoeverman v. Fedlman 2 held that he could be. The principles
underlying this holding were explained in this term's Kruse v.
Shieve.73
It was there held that a supervisory employee owes a duty of
care to his employer, but not to his fellow employees.74 The em-
ployer's duty to care for his employee's safety is, of course, gov-
erned by the Safe Place Law.75 Thus common-law third-party ac-
tions may not be maintained against supervisory employees as
such.76 Third-party actions may be maintained against a corporate
officer (or other supervisory employee) "only when such officer has
doffed the cap of corporate officer, and donned the cap of a co-
employee.'"77 The switch takes place when the officer acts affirma-
tively to increase the risk to the employees, as opposed to merely
68. 60 Wis. 2d at 635, 211 N.W.2d at 419.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 637, 638, 211 N.W.2d at 420. Damages is an alternative remedy where a
nuisance is not enjoinable. Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172
N.W.2d 647 (1969).
71. 60 Wis. 2d at 638, 211 N.W.2d at 420. See Dolata v. Berthelet Fuel & Supply Co.,
254 Wis. 194, 36 N.W.2d 97 (1949).
72. 220 Wis. 557, 265 N.W. 580 (1936).
73. 61 Wis. 2d 421, 213 N.W.2d 64 (1973).
74. Id. at 429, 213 N.W.2d at 67.
75. WIs. STAT. § 101.11 (1971).
76. Wasley v. Kosmatka, 50 Wis. 2d 738, 184 N.W.2d 882 (1971).
77. 61 Wis. 2d at 425, 213 N.W.2d at 66.
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defaulting in his duty of maintaining the employer's safe place
standards.8 Examples of such affirmative negligence include negli-
gently directing a particular act in a particular manner,79 and driv-
ing a truck negligently.80
While the general intention of Wisconsin Statute section 102.03
is to avoid dual employer liability for work-related injuries to em-
ployees,8 1 the two-hat theory of Kruse supports an argument for
third-party employer liability. A duty of care in performance of
supervisory duties is owed the employer and goes to his safe place
responsibilities. Non-supervisory employees arguably owe their
employer a similar employment-based duty to follow instructions
aimed at establishing a safe place of employment. But these em-
ployees have a concomitant common-law duty of ordinary care for
their co-employees' safety. Supervisory employees are under the
same duty when they engage in "affirmative" action, as stated in
Kruse' Does not then, an employer have a common-law duty of
ordinary care for his employees safety when he engages in affirma-
tive action? An employer who works in production alongside his
employees would be a reckless production-worker indeed if his care
were restricted to following whatever administrative instructions
he might have laid down. By itself employer-superintendance lacks
both the detail and the flexibility to provide adequate safety in
places of employment. The preservation of common-law negli-
gence liability by means of section 102.29 third-party actions con-
stitutes legislative recognition of the indispensability of common-
law tort liability in preserving employee safety. The question is,
despite section 102.03, does section 102.29 contemplate the em-
ployer sometimes wearing the third-party hat?82 Kruse suggests
that it might.
78. Id. at 428, 213 N.W.2d at 67, 68.
79. 220 Wis. 557, 265 N.W. 580 (1936).
80. 50 Wis. 2d 738, 184 N.W.2d 882 (1971).
81. See Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 607, 608, 204 N.W.2d 897,
907, 908 (1973).
82. The argument contra is based upon Kerner v. Employers Mut. Ins. of Wausau, 35
Wis. 2d 391, 151 N.W.2d 72 (1966), wherein the defendant was both the workman's com-
pensation and public liability carrier of the employer. The plaintiffs recovered under the
Act and sued defendant for negligence in a safety inspection. The supreme court held:
The dual roles of the compensation carrier are so intertwined that the exclusive
remedy means no cause of action against the carrier in its capacity of public liability
carrier.
Id. at 400, 151 N.W.2d at 77. Are not the roles of employer-coemployee, where they coexist,
even more intertwined?
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The court also this term fashioned a test for compensability
under the act of nontraumatic mental injuries. In School District
No. 1 v. ILHR13 a high-school student counselor suffered acute
anxiety and nervousness after discovering a student recommenda-
tion that she be replaced. Concerned to avoid spurious claims and
to implement the statutory requirement of accidental causes the
court adapted to the employer context the rule as expressed in
Alsteen v. Gehl, for compensability in tort for the intentional infl-
iction of emotional distress.15 That rule requires outrageous con-
duct on the part of the defendant. Thus School District No. I
requires that a cause be "out of the ordinary from the countless
emotional strains and differences that employees encounter daily
without serious mental injury" 6 before liability will be found under
Wisconsin Statute chapter 102. Therefore in an action for purely
mental injuries, one does not take the plaintiff as one finds him.
The counselor's "accident" was found wanting as measured by this
standard.
III. INTENTIONAL TORT LIABILITY
A. Libel
As it is defined by Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 7 the
Times-Sullivan rule 8 of partial immunity of defendants in defama-
tion suits brought by public figures or private persons involved in
public controversies was modified by the recent United States Su-
preme Court case of Gertz v. Welch. 9 That case vitiated
Rosenbloom to the extent that Rosenbloom extended the Times-
Sullivan rule to private persons who do not intentionally call public
attention to themselves."
In Richards v. Gruen," the plaintiff, a private person, went
before the Glendale city council and there made a severe personal
attack on Glendale Alderman Gruen. At a later date Gruen re-
sponded before the same body with a false defamatory statement.
The supreme court held that Gruen was entitled to a Times-
83. 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).
84. See Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2)(d).
85. 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
86. 62 Wis. 2d at 378, 215 N.W.2d 377 (1974).
87. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
88. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
89. - U.S. - 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
90. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 3008-30 10.
91. 62 Wis. 2d 99, 214 N.W.2d 309 (1974).
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Sullivan instruction to the effect that a verdict for plaintiff required
clear and convincing proof of a reckless disregard for the truth of
the statement. Two grounds for this holding were given: first that
Richards fell within the "event of public or general concern"9 test
laid down in Rosenbloom, and second, that in appearing before the
city council and challenging an alderman, Richards "placed him-
self in an area of matters of public or general interest. ' 9 3 The
court was obviously depending upon Rosenbloom. However, while
the first stated ground stems exclusively from Rosenbloom, the
second stated ground is capable of being read as satisfying the
more stringent Gertz formulation of the Times-Sullivan rule. That
is, by entering a public arena and initiating a controversy there,
Richards although remaining a private person intentionally at-
tracted public notice to himself. 4 In doing so he became a public
figure and discarded the protection afforded him as a private indi-
viduar.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Wisconsin does not recognize a cause of action for invasion of
privacy,9" but facts which would support such an action will often
also support an action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, so long as Alsteen v. Gehl" requirements are met. These
requirements are (1) intentional conduct for the purpose of causing
mental harm; (2) such conduct is extreme and outrageous; (3) such
conduct caused the injury; and (4) the injury is totally disabling,
at least temporarily."
Slawek v. Stroh9" discussed supra in connection with the wrong-
ful birth cause of action is an example of a claim pleaded as inva-
sion of privacy but which survived demurrer by alleging facts stat-
ing a cause of action under A lsteen v. Gehl. Defendant-mother had
alleged by way of counterclaim that the plaintiff telephoned her at
her family's home at all hiours of the day and night, used trick
voices, disguises, false names and wild ruses to insinuate himself
92. Id. at 109, 214 N.W.2d at 314.
93. Id. at 110, 214 N.W.2d at 314.
94. In Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1971), a false defamatory
letter-to-the-editor published in a newspaper was viewed as the entry of a private person
into the public arena so as to trigger Times-Sullivan immunity.
95. Judevine v. Benzies-Montanyne Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W.
259 (1936); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
96. 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
97. Id. at 359, 360, 361, 124 N.W.2d at 318.
98. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
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into her company and that plaintiff thereby caused defendant great
mental anguish and distress and held her up to public and private
ridicule.99
C. False Imprisonment
Harris v. Kelly' deals with the question of potential exposure
to joint liability for wrongful arrest which is involved in summon-
ing the police to deal with a disorderly person. In that case plaintiff
Harris went to the offices of the Milwaukee Medical Society to
request an investigation into the death of her husband. She became
loud and abusive and after four hours of unsuccessful attempts to
convince her to leave, the police were called and told that an emo-
tionally upset woman was disrupting operations of the office. Two
officers responded and took plaintiff to a hospital for temporary
commitment under Wisconsin Statute section 51.04(l).101 Plaintiff
brought an action for false imprisonment.
Addressing itself to the issue of whether by calling the police
defendant medical society employees could have participated in
plaintiff's wrongful imprisonment the supreme court adopted the
rule:
One who participates in an unlawful arrest, or procures or insti-
gates the making of one without proper authority, will be liable
for the consequences; but the defendant must have taken some
active part in bringing about the unlawful arrest itself, by some
"affirmative direction, persuasion, request or voluntary
participation." There is no liability for merely giving information
to legal authorities who are left entirely free to use their own
judgment.'
By calling police and stating that plaintiff was upset and disruptive,
defendants did not take an active part in or procure plaintiff's
committment in the court's view. 13 The police officers' own obser-
vations were the basis of their action. Had defendants urged com-
mittment or assisted in any way in its accomplishment the affirma-
tive participation test might well have been met. Lack of knowl-
edge of the invalidity of the arrest would not be a defense."°4
99. Id. at 314, 215 N.W.2d at 17, 18.
100. 63 Wis. 2d 664, 218 N.W.2d 360 (1974).
101. WIs. STAT. § 51.04(1) provides that a police officer may take a violent person into
custody and further provides for temporary hospitalization of such persons.
102. 62 Wis. 2d at 667, 668, 218 N.W.2d at 362, quoting from PROSSER, LAW oFToRRs
47 (4th ed. 1971).
103. 63 Wis. 2d at 669, 218 N.W.2d at 363.
104. Lemke v. Anders, 261 Wis. 555, 563, 53 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1952).
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IV. CAUSATION
A. Successive and Concurrent Tortfeasors
Johnson v. Heintz'05 raised once again the question of succes-
sive and concurrent tortfeasors. Johnson was injured while a pas-
senger in Heintz's car when it stalled in a blizzard and was rear-
ended by Bruhn. Twenty minutes later Thomas struck Bruhn's
disabled automobile and drove it into the Heintz car, thereby caus-
ing additional injuries to Johnson who was pinned inside as a result
of the first accident. Johnson commenced suit against Heintz and
Bruhn. Bruhn settled and Heintz impleaded Thomas for contribu-
tion. Thomas appealed on the ground that the right to contribution
exists only among joint tortfeasors.
Joint tort liability cannot be based upon indivisible injuries
caused by successive tortfeasors. °6 To establish joint liability inde-
pendent torts must concur in time to inflict a single injury.0 7
Applying these principles the court held that damages, albeit indi-
visible in fact, must be allocated by the jury as between the two
accidents. Since Thomas could neither foresee nor avoid the inju-
ries caused by the first accident she was not subject to liability for
them. However Heintz could foresee that her car, driven in bliz-
zard conditions, might stall, and in stalling might be rear-ended,
so as to pin her passenger inside. Heintz could also foresee that this
situation might cause a second accident, further injuring Johnson.
Thus Heintz's negligence in driving in the blizzard contributed to
the first accident as well as becoming a substantial factor, concur-
rent with Thomas' negligence, of the second accident. Heintz and
Thomas were, then, joint tortfeasors only with respect to those
injuries Johnson received in the second collision.""s This result con-
forms to those cases where injuries caused by one tortfeasor are
negligently treated by a second tortfeasor, °9 or where the plaintiff
is injured in a second collision while being conveyed by ambulance
from the accident scene." 0 In each of these situations the jury must
determine the plaintiffs total damages, allocate those damages as
105. 61 Wis. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973).
106. Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hospital, 51 Wis. 2d 281, 290, 187 N.W.2d 349, 353
(1971), reversing Heims v. Hanke, 5 Wis. 2d 465, 93 N.W.2d 455 (1958) and Balick v.
Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421, 67 N.W.2d 860 (1955).
107. 51 Wis. 2d at 288, 289, 187 N.W.2d at 353.
108. 61 Wis. 2d at 601, 213 N.W.2d at 93.
109. 51 Wis. 2d 281; Selleck v. City of Janesville, 100 Wis. 157, 75 N.W. 975 (1898).
110. Fitzwilliams v. O'Shaughnessy, 40 Wis. 2d 123, 161 N.W.2d 242 (1968).
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between the two accidents, and then make separate comparisons
of negligence for each accident.
B. Policy Limitations of Tort Liability
By a policy decision, the court in A. E. Investment discussed
the defendant's duty of due care to an unforeseeable plaintiff.
Given an act and its relation as cause-in-fact of a plaintiff's injury,
tort liability could theoretically be limited in terms of legal duty,
i.e., of legally protectable plaintiff-interest,"' or in terms of legal
cause.12 Since defendant architects were negligent with respect to
some foreseeable person, the court reasoned that their liability for
subsequent harm was potentially unlimited and held that it was the
role of the court to determine those unforeseeable plaintiffs who
should not be allowed to recover for reasons of public policy." 3
In this case the court found that the plaintiff sublessee was within
the defendant architects' duty of ordinary care.
However, the court refused to allow recovery to an unforesee-
able plaintiff in Reshan v. Harvey."4 Therein an automobile in
which plaintiffs were passengers went out of control while
travelling northbound on a divided highway, crossed the median,
and entered the inside southbound lane where it was struck broad-
side by defendant's car. Defendant was found to have maintained
proper speed, management and control but to have been negligent
with respect to lookout. The supreme court held that defendant
was not under a duty to maintain any lookout with respect to the
northbound lanes but was under such a duty with respect to the
median." 5 However the court excused the negligence on the basis
of public policy.
An example of limited tort liability on the basis of remoteness
of cause was seen in Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc.." An
intern in defendant hospital inserted a catheter in plaintiff's shoul-
der in such a way that the catheter broke into four pieces. Two
pieces could not be recovered and plaintiff developed a "phobia"
that they would cause cancer. The supreme court held that al-
though the intern's negligence was a substantial factor or cause-
111. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234, 234 N.W. 372, 376 (1931).
112. Id. at 239, 234 N.W. at 378.
113. 62 Wis. 2d at 484, 214 N.W.2d at 766. Cf. Hass v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry.
Co., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885, 888 (1970).
114. 63 Wis. 2d 524, 217 N.W.2d 302 (1974).
115. Brown v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 251 Wis. 188, 192, 28 N.W.2d 306, 308 (1947).
116. 63 Wis. 2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383 (1974).
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in-fact of the phobia, it was too remote an injury for recovery to
be allowed."' Cause-in-fact and legal cause were held not to be
identical.
V. DAMAGES
A. Collateral Source Rule
Although dealing primarily with procedural issues, the recent
decision of Heifetz v. Johnson"' appears to have abrogated the
collateral source rule as applied to insurance payments. The collat-
eral source rule reflects the punitive aspect of tort damages' and
provides that a plaintiff's independent sources of compensation will
not inure to the benefit of the tortfeasor and reduce his liability.
The circumstances in Heifetz produced a collision between the
collateral source rule and the rule of subrogation.
Heifetz involved an auto accident insurer's payment of $2,000
to its insured for medical expenses arising from a collision. The
insured commenced suit against the defendant but did not join his
own insurer. The statute of limitations ran against plaintiff's in-
surer and defendants raised the $2,000 payment as mitigation of
damages. The supreme court held that via subrogation the plaintiff
had assigned to the insurer that part of his claim, and thus, the
statute of limitations having run, that part of the cause of action
against the defendants had been extinguished. 2 1
The court reasoned that to allow the plaintiff to recover the
$2,000 as trustee for his insurer would defeat the purpose of the
statute of limitations.'2' The court also placed strong emphasis
upon the operation of subrogation:
The acceptance of payment by an insurer [Heritage here] oper-
ates as a virtual assignment of the cause of action to the insurer
and a part payment operates as an assignment pro tanto. The
insurance company may bring suit against the tort-feasor in its
own name by virtue of this assignment. 22
117. Id. at 518, 217 N.W.2d at 385. Justice Robert Hansen, concurring, made a
persuasive argument that an unreasonable present fear of future harm is not an interest
protected by tort law. Id. at 523, 217 N.W.2d at 387. Thus Justice Hansen would limit
liability in this case by applying policy to duty rather than cause. For similar policy limita-
tions see this term's wrongful birth cases, Slawek v. Stroh, supra and Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co.. supra.
118. 61 Wis. 2d 111,211 N.W.2d 834 (1973).
119. Denhart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 21 Wis. 2d 583, 595, 124 N.W.2d 664 (1963).
120. 61 Wis. 2d at 124, 211 N.W.2d at 841.
121. Id.
122. 61 Wis. 2d at 114, 115, 211 N.W.2d at 836. By ignoring the indemnifica-
[Vol. 58
TERM OF THE COURT
Thus, in Wisconsin the operation of the collateral source rule
as applied to insurance payments seems to have been severely lim-
ited.
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Actions Against Architects
Rosenthal v. Kurz, discussed supra, raises the issue of when the
statute of limitations commences to run on architects' negligent
liability. Wisconsin Statute section 893.155 provides that with re-
spect to negligent design, construction or supervision of construc-
tion of improvements to land no action shall be brought "more
than 6 years after the performance or furnishing of such services
and construction." The period of limitation runs from the accrual
of the cause of action, which is to say the time when the damage
occurred. But mistakes by architects, like mistakes by physicians,
may result in damage that remains latent for the period during
which an action may be brought. In cases of medical malpractice,
the court in Olson v. St. Croix Valley Memorial Hospital,23 had
ruled that the period of limitation begins to run with the incurring
of latent injuries caused by defendant's negligence. For architects,
however, the Rosenthal court adopted the rationale of Peterson v.
Roloff§2 opposing the Olson rule. There Justice Hallows argued
that a cause of action has not accrued until there is "an injury
which is recognizable in money damages."'
B. Wrongful Death Actions
If a person is wrongfully injured on December 15th and dies
as a result on the following January 15th when does the period of
limitations for a wrongful death action begin to run? 12 This ques-
tion was raised and answered in Bradley v. Knutson.2  Therein
tion/investment insurance distinction of Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 136 Wis.
34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908), the court in this excerpt nominally extends subrogation to all
insurance payments. Restricted to its facts, however, Heifetz is not significantly broader
with respect to subrogation than Patitucci v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932).
123. 55 Wis. 2d 628, 210 N.W.2d 63 (1972).
124. 57 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 203 N.W.2d 699, 703 (1973).
125. Since the language of § 893.155, Wis. STAT., does not admit of a construction
directly implementing this rule the court adopted, as a stopgap measure pending legislative
revision, an interpretation which is as close as possible to the desired results. This is that
the period of limitation for negligent architectural services commences with the completion
of construction. Rosenthal v. Kurtz, supra at 13, 213 N.W.2d at 747.
126. WIs. STAT. § 893.205(2) provides that the period of limitations for a wrongful death
action is 3 years.
127. 62 Wis. 2d 432, 215 N.W.2d 369 (1974).
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defendant-appellant Madison Newspapers, Inc. was sued in negli-
gence for alleged failure to timely promulgate, by publication in
the Wisconsin State Journal, an amendment to the wrongful death
act'2 which raised the maximum recoverable amount from $22,000
to $35,000.129 The decedent was injured two days after the amend-
ment was signed into law and died eight days after he was injured.
The amendment was promulgated and thereby became effective
five days after decedent's death. At trial and on appeal plaintiff-
respondent claimed that her cause of action did not accrue until
decedent's death, and that but for the State Journal's dilatoriness
the higher limit on recovery would have applied at that time.
The supreme court held that the amendment created a new
cause of action for the additional $10,000 of potential recovery."
The determinative issue of whether the wrongful death cause of
action attaches at the time of the injury or the time of death", was
controlled by Quinn v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.3' In that
case a brother and sister commenced a wrongful death action as a
result of the death of their brother. Between the time of the injury
to the decedent and commencement of the action the legislature
amended the statute to include brothers and sisters among those
who may maintain wrongful death actions. The court held that
while the cause of action does not arise until the death of the
decedent, it exists inchoately from the time of the injury and that
its legal status is fixed at that earlier time for purposes of who may
sue as plaintiff.3 3 Applying this relation-back approach to
Bradley the court held that the amount of maximum recovery was
established at $22,000 at the time of the injury. 34
TIMOTHY K. TOLLAKSEN
128. Wis. STAT. § 895.03 (1971).
129. WIS. STAT. § 895.04(4) (1971). Subsequent amendment in 1971 eliminated the
ceiling for total recovery. Laws of 1971, ch. 59.
130. See Keely v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 139 Wis. 448, 454, 121 N.W. 167 (1909).
131. 62 Wis. 2d at 435, 213 N.W.2d at 370.
132. 141 Wis. 497, 124 N.W. 653 (1910).
133. Id. at 499, 500, 124 N.W. at 655.
134. 62 Wis. 2d at 439, 215 N.W.2d at 372.
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